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Abstract—Digital manufacturing (DM) cyber-physical system
is vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. HACK3D is
a series of crowdsourcing red-team-blue-team events hosted by
the NYU Center for Cybersecurity to assess the strength of the
security methods embedded in designs using DM. This study
summarizes the lessons learned from the past three offerings of
HACK3D, including ingenious ways in which skilled engineers
can launch surprising attacks on DM designs not anticipated
before. A key outcome is a taxonomy-guided creation of DM
security benchmarks for use by the DM community.
Index Terms—Digital Manufacturing, Crowdsourcing, Security
Assessment, HACK3D
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital manufacturing (DM) security is gaining attention
due to the involvement of trusted, partially trusted, and un-
trusted parties in the supply chain [1]. A survey and taxonomy
of threats and vulnerabilities have been developed [2]. This
survey of taxonomies shows that numerous attack vectors exist
for the DM process chain but only a few specialized security
schemes are available for this complex cyber-physical system
(CPS). For example, DM attack vectors and impacts have been
discussed from a cyber-physical perspective in [3]. Similarly,
a stealthy DM tool path modification attack can go undetected
[4]. These attacks highlight the need for improved quality
controls, cybersecurity education, and development of DM
security assessment. A methodology for detecting attacks on
an artifact’s intrinsic behavior is presented in [5].
The DM process model has been studied and a new “feder-
ated” information systems architecture for DM has been devel-
oped in [6]. This architecture establishes requirements for end-
to-end information sharing, quality control, and performance
assurance. [7] investigate Intellectual Property (IP) protection
for outsourced manufacturing, and study an alternative model
that incorporates third party process tuning experts. The paper
presents a risk assessment focused on IP protection and makes
recommendation to minimize risks of this model. Further-
more, [8] surveys significance of DM for national security.
A variety of cybersecurity methods have been developed
that are specific to DM. These methods include hiding features
in the design files and printing high-quality parts from these
files by unauthorized users difficult [9]. Embedding identifi-
cation codes inside parts has been explored [10]. These codes
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are obfuscated by breaking them into hundreds of segments
and hiding these segments in numerous layers in the part [11].
This study reports the outcomes of a series of crowdsourcing
events focused on understanding the strengths and weaknesses
of the security methods developed for DM. We will describe
the HACK3D1 designs and the attack methods developed by
the participants. We will conclude with lessons learned from
the crowdsourcing-based HACK3D events.
Paper roadmap. In Section II, we provide an overview of
DM CPS, challenges in developing cybersecurity solutions
for DM and a taxonomy of DM cyber threats. Section III
presents HACK3D, a crowdsourced red-team-blue-team event
that NYU CCS has been organizing since 2018 to evaluate
DM security methods. Concluding remarks are in Section IV.
II. THE DM CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM
A. The Digital Manufacturing Process Chain
Figure 1 shows the DM process chain that includes
computer-aided design (CAD), design refinement by simula-
tion tools such as finite element analysis (FEA), manufacturing
of the part on a 3D printer followed by test and assembly.
The product design process remains the same even in tradi-
tional manufacturing such as machining or milling. All steps
involved in DM use computers and cloud for computation, col-
laboration, machine control, and data acquisition and analysis.
Hence, all these steps are targets for cyber attacks.
B. Taxonomy of cyber threats faced by DM
The attacks involved in the DM supply chain are classified
in four categories as illustrated in Figure 2 [12]. For each
category in the classification, different skills and tools are
needed for a successful attack. As shown in Figure 3, the
cybersecurity threats present in the DM supply chain can be
classified across four attack categories (goals, methods, targets,
and countermeasures). Several security methods are available
that can be applied to DM supply chain but strength of these
methods for DM supply chain needs to be analyzed.
III. HACK3D ASSESSES STRENGTH OF DM SECURITY
An effective and widely used approach to assess the strength
of security strategies is to conduct a red-team-blue team chal-
lenge involving participants from a diverse set of backgrounds.
1https://www.csaw.io/hack3d
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Fig. 1. The digital manufacturing (DM) cyber-physical system makes use of connected systems such as 3D printers. STL refers to stereolithography file
format and NDE refers to non-destructive evaluation methods such as radiography, ultrasonic imaging and tomography
Fig. 2. Classification of attacks in DM supply chain [12].
The objective of the HACK3D challenge is to provide a plat-
form for these red-blue challenges to evaluate the robustness
of new DM security strategies. The HACK3D research team
takes the role of the blue team, designing security methods for
the manufacturing process, and presents them as HACK3D
challenges. The approaches target a wide range of threats,
including a focus on securing the digital design files.
Red teams are crowd-sourced from a diverse population
of students spanning all education levels and backgrounds.
Their solutions provided a wide range of perspectives, some of
which have not been considered when the blue team designed
the security challenges. These security assessment benchmarks
help determine the strengths and weaknesses of the blue team’s
challenges, providing qualitative and quantitative insights for
the design of future DM security policies and strategies.
Each challenge investigates a pathway in the threat taxon-
omy from [2] as shown in Figure 3. In the preliminary rounds
of HACK3D, the red teams had at least one month to solve
the challenge. The final round was held onsite at New York
University in 2018 and 2019 and became a virtual event in
2020 as part of the annual NYU Cybersecurity Awareness
Week (CSAW) in early November. The participants had 1-2
days to solve the challenges in the final round.
A. Challenge 1 (HACK3D 2018 Qualifying Challenge)
Challenge. The participants received a set of XYZ coordinates
in the 3D space describing the shape of a part (see Figure 4(a)).
The red teams use this information to recreate a 3D model of
the object. The XYZ coordinates can be visualized as a point
cloud shown in Figure 4(b).
Threat Scenario. Challenge 1 exemplifies attacks that can
be launched using the point cloud information of a design.
These point cloud data can be generated from 3D scanners.
This challenge shows the capability of computer visualization
software to recover the CAD model from a point cloud file
representing the part. Red-team participants take on the role of
the adversary to develop their own reverse engineering method
to recover the design files by using the point cloud information.
Attacks. One red team used Microsoft Excel to convert the
coordinates into a point cloud and imported it into SolidWorks.
They created a mesh using GeoMagic Add-in and obtained
reference curves from the meshes. By combining the reference
curves and the point cloud outline, the team recreated the
3D model. Another red team used the FeatureScript tool in
OnShape. The team developed scripts to extract information
from the coordinates, draw poly lines, and delete unnecessary
faces layer-by-layer. This way they recreated the 234 layers
and assembled them to recreate the model. A third red team
of mechanical engineers used the Scanto3D tool in SolidWorks
to reconstruct the 3D model.
B. Challenge 2 (HACK3D 2018 Final Challenge)
Challenge. The participants received stereolithography (STL)
files of two designs (Figure 4(c)) and were invited to identify
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Fig. 3. The attack vectors that the HACK3D challenges demonstrated so far are highlighted in a taxonomy of security threats faced by DM from [2].
the correct slicing and printing orientations that would remove
all surface and internal defects. These two models were de-
signed to have security features such that if they are not sliced
in a specific direction using the required slicing parameters,
the prints will have either internal or surface defects.
Threat Scenario. This challenge mimics a real-world situation
that STL files are somehow leaked to adversaries due to, e.g.,
disgruntled insiders or hacked file storage servers. However,
the designers were able to embed defects in the design
and want to prevent attackers from producing high-quality
products just using the STL files. The intentional addition
of the embedded defects is an example of an obfuscation
countermeasure that was designed by the blue team.
Attacks. Most teams sliced the models in different orienta-
tions to check whether the defects and nicks survive. Some
participants created a table to enumerate all possible rotations.
Since, we have x- y- and z-axis and since one can rotate by
360 degrees along these axes, there are 3603 ≈ 4.7 × 107
combinations (considering a 1-degree rotation step). Although
the brute force tries all these combinations, the red teams came
up with strategies to narrow down the search space and get to
the correct solution within the challenge time of 7 hours.
First, the participants characterized design A as a complex,
open prism with several holes. The flaws were introduced due
to the presence of segmentation in each layer (Figure 4(d)),
which decreases structural integrity of the print. Their main
goal was to find an orientation for design A such that each
layer shows a continuous toolpath. Second, the surface area of
the bottom layer is considered when the challenge participants
were seeking the correct orientation. The bottom layer needs
larger area and mass, so that it can improve the quality of
printing; a larger bottom layer provides a superior adhesion to
the base plate. After a few trials with the different orientations,
some participants found the correct orientation for printing.
Design B is a solid box. However, inside the box, rect-
angular prisms were embedded with spade shaped flaws,
giving the surface several nicks (Figure 4(e)). The participants
discovered that the nicks remain if they do not turn the printing
orientation, regardless of the choice of the bottom layer. By
fine tuning the rotation angle, they eventually found the correct
orientations for printing the Design B without internal defects.
The correct printing orientations for Design A and B are shown
in Figure 4(f) and Figure 4(g), respectively.
C. Challenge 3 (HACK3D 2019 Qualifying Challenge)
Challenge. For this challenge, the red teams mimic attackers
who steal a partially damaged G-code file, which only models
the bottom part of a chess piece. Figure 4(h) shows the dam-
aged G-code as viewed in a G-code viewer. The participants
needed to solve two problems: (1) identify the correct piece
among the three candidates pieces (Pawn, Bishop, Queen)
that the partial design represents and (2) complete the design
with the correct dimensions. The blue team provided an
orthographic image of all candidates in Figure 4(i), and a text
file with true z-heights of each piece.
The blue team organizers embedded a non-trivial shortcut
in the damaged G-code for solving the challenge. They placed
the design file of the top half of the chess piece into a
separate text file stored on the cloud, giving view-only access
to those with a link. This link was embedded as a 3D quick
response (QR) code in the design of the chess base given to
the participants [10].
Threat Scenario. This challenge is an example of a cyber-
security threat where the adversary is launching an attack on
the design files to steal the design for counterfeiting. Each
participant of the HACK3D Challenge 3 took on the role of the
red-team designer working on the G-code to find the hidden
information to recreate the complete file. The embedded QR
code was used in the design to counter such direct sabotage
attacks on the design files.
Attacks. One of the teams exploited the discrepancy in the
metadata in the G-code file. They noticed that the filament
length in the original piece (4290.7 mm) was different from
that shown by the G-code viewer (3198.14 mm). This offered
insights into the cut-off design and they concluded that all
pieces had a square cross-section. Next, using the provided z-
heights and the extracted height of the base piece from the G-
code, they determined where the chess piece was cut off. They
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Fig. 4. In HACK3D Challenge 1, the participants were asked to reconstruct the 3D model (a) given a set of XYZ coordinates that describes the design. The
coordinates can be visualized as a point cloud as in (b). In Challenge 2, the participants received STL files of designs A and B shown in (c). They had to find
the correct orientation to slice and print that would eliminate surface and internal defects. If printed without rotation, design A will be separated in multiple
segments as in (d) and design B will have internal slots as shown in (e). The correct orientations for printing and the supporting materials for designs A and B
are shown in (f) and (g), respectively. In HACK3D Challenge 3, given (h) a partial (possibly damaged) G-code file, the attacker has to reconstruct the original
G-code file that is cut off from a chess piece from among the (i) three candidates. If one views the 3D QR code embedded in the chess base from a random
direction, it looks like a group of spheres like (j). However, viewed from the correct angle, it is a scannable QR code shown in (k). In HACK3D Challenge 4,
the participants were given a female connector (in yellow) and a scaled-down version of the STL file of the female connector. They were challenged to use
this information to reverse engineer the male part. Three reconstructed designs are shown in (l). In HACK3D Challenge 5, the participants had to recreate
the lightbulb CAD based on the sketches in (m). In the center of the sketches, a unique code shown in (n) exists for participants to decode. The deformed
results of the linear static simulation in HACK3D Challenge 6 is saved into a VRML file in (o). The maximum stress of the simulation is stored in a binary
format and hidden in the color index section of the VRML file in (p).
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cropped the tops off of each chess piece and used computer
vision algorithms to measure the pixel dimensions and then
scaled the dimensions using information from the G-code.
They reconstructed the G-code for the top of all three pieces.
Since they knew the height difference between the original
and the damaged piece, they were able to deduce the Queen
as the target piece, as it matched closest in height. The final
result had an error of 1%.
A second red team processed the image and created a profile
of the edges of the chess pieces. This produced a 1% error in
the geometry as the image processing led to a pixelated line.
Based on this chess piece edge information, the team created
the shell of the Queen with the help of a few reference points in
the G-code and filled the top and bottom layers with infill. The
third team also used image processing methods. However, they
took a different approach and produced a square prism at each
point on the profile curve to recreate the pieces. They inferred
that the chess piece was the Queen based on the filament length
information in the damaged G-code.
Two of the teams recognized the QR code embedded in the
chess base. This embedded QR code was segmented into small
pieces and appear as a bundle of spheres shown in Figure 4(j).
Only when viewed from a certain direction, the QR code could
be seen as Figure 4(k). One team extracted this QR code from
the G-code and then extracted the design file of the chess piece
stored on the cloud server.
D. Challenge 4 (HACK3D 2019 Final Challenge)
Challenge. targeted reverse engineering phase in the DM
supply chain and file forensics. The red-team participants were
given a physical print and a scaled-down version of the STL
file of a female connector (yellow parts in Figure 4(l)). The
challenge entailed construction of a male connector with the
appropriate design and dimensions compatible with the female
connector. Similar to Challenge 3, the design of the female
connector had a 3D data matrix embedded within. This matrix,
when viewed from the correct orientation, had the password of
an online server whose internet protocol address and username
were stored within the header of the STL file.
Threat Scenario of this challenge is reverse engineering by
an adversary who has stolen the design files. The adversary
steals design file information for pirating and/or counterfeiting.
Participants of this challenge played the role of the adversary
and are tasked to create a male connector with only the female
connector part information. Success of this challenge confirms
that reverse engineering techniques may be used to obtain
information about the missing/complementary components of
a design from a stolen component.
Attacks. Under a tight time constraint of 6 hours, one red team
was able to extract all the required information to access the
design file stored in the server. The male part was designed
with a snap fit and arms to prevent rotation (the left one in
Figure 4(l)). Another red team took a geometric approach and
recreated a tight slide fit male part of the female part along
with the scale factor. While they were able to get the data
matrix, they could not recover the hidden message in the STL
file. Hence they did not access the file stored on the server.
Their final design is the right most one in Figure 4(l). Finally,
one team manipulated the STL file and isolated a single cross-
section of triangles to create a profile of the female part. After
fine-tuning the profile, they conducted multiple design and
printing iterations of a snug fit to slide on the male connector
(the middle one in Figure 4(l)). Such brute force approach
was very time and material intensive as 3D printing of the
part took more than half an hour each time.
E. Challenge 5 (HACK3D 2020 Qualifying Challenge)
Challenge. Participants were given an Initial Graphics Ex-
change Specification (IGES) file of a lightbulb design that
had all its solid body geometry removed and replaced with
sketches. This challenge was to reverse engineer the lightbulb
CAD model from these sketches. The sketches provided an
overview of how the part should look like, but it is hard to
determine the dimensions precisely. Further, a hidden Morse
code sketch was embedded into the center of the bulb to
allow the participants to obtain the original 2D drawing of the
lightbulb if it was was decoded correctly. Figure 4(m) shows
this hidden code, where the short vertical lines represent dots
and the long vertical lines represent dashes in the Morse code.
The IGES file is shown in Figure 4(n), it only has 3D sketches
that represent the silhouette of the lightbulb design created
from planar section cuts of the actual model.
Threat Scenario. The main purpose of this challenge was to
simulate the scenario in which an attacker launches IP theft
attack on the engineering design files. The blue team saved the
design file with a unique storage method and the red teams
had to recover these files. In this challenge, the initial feedback
from some of the teams was that the IGES file was opening as
an empty, broken file. The import options of the software had
to be modified to be able to view the IGES file correctly. One
aspect of this challenge is to help introduce the idea of playing
with the storage method to better protect design information.
Attacks. Most teams approached the challenge by approxi-
mating the measurements of the features of the lightbulb and
recreating the part based on the measured dimensions. One
team decided to view the IGES file in a text editor and was
able to recover the information about the original design file.
The team proceeded to extract the center plane sketches to
determine the radius of the glass bulb. They recreated the
remaining features by analyzing the small sections of the
sketches and recovered the dimensions of these features.
The challenge file had a lot of sketches that had to be
properly filtered and analyzed. Otherwise, it can lead to wrong
inferences about the features in the design. The multiple cross-
sectional planar sketches misled one red team in designing
asymmetric support rods. They used this incorrect assumption
in their design. The same team successfully determined that
the filament had no cross-section thickness sketch but it did not
evoke suspicion. They guessed the cross section was circular
but could not conclude that the filament was a coded message.
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F. Challenge 6 (HACK3D 2020 Final Challenge)
Challenge. A linear-static FEA simulation was conducted
on the challenge model and the results were exported to a
Virtual Reality Modeling Language (VRML) file as shown
in Figure 4(o). The VRML file shows a graphics body rep-
resentation of the deformed part, containing the stress result
colors and facets from the mesh of the simulation. Based on
the given data, the red teams were tasked to determine the
maximum value of the FEA and to add back the missing
interior connectors.
In the interior of the part, the blue team inscribed a code as
an insignificant part number. This number references a line
in the VRML file when viewed in a text editor. The line
corresponds to the color index in the file and this is where the
red, green, and blue (RGB) values of each facets are stored.
The value and units of measurement of the maximum stress
of the simulation were converted into binary value and stored
in the VRML file. The binary values replaced the digits that
came after the decimal for the green intensity value of the
color index as shown in Figure 4(p).
Threat Scenario. The attack depicted in this challenge is
malicious reduction in structural integrity of the part. An
adversary can access the design files and inject defects into the
model that is then carried out into the manufacturing stage. If
the defect is not detected, the production parts will have the
defect in them and the parts can malfunction during operation.
The blue team used this challenge to assess the effectiveness of
storing simulation data within design files. The set of original
simulation results hidden within the design file can be retrieved
to verify the integrity of the part.
Attacks. Only one team was able to follow the clues in
the VRML file, which led them to the line containing the
binary values. They successfully determined the value of the
maximum stress in the simulation of the part. Two teams
followed a different approach of conducting a new simulation
study to obtain the maximum stress value. The teams had
to generate a new CAD file because they could not use the
deformed model in a simulation analysis. It was difficult
to perform the simulation study because there was a lot of
missing information about the simulation input data. The
teams had to guess the applied load, material, and correct
fixtures for the part.
A team of computer science students realized that the file
stores the RGB value of each facet in the file and the maximum
stress values corresponds to the facet that are red. They located
two color indices that had the red color in the VRML file. They
tried to relate them to other information in hopes to obtain
the maximum stress. While the team failed in uncovering any
further helpful information within the time constraints, this
was a very creative approach.
G. Statistics
Twenty-four red teams registered to compete in the Chal-
lenge 3 round of the 2019 HACK3D. Each team had 2-4
students, who were pursuing a degree in either mechanical
engineering, computer science or computer engineering. Five
teams advanced to the final round. In the 2020 HACK3D
Qualifying Challenge 5, 43 teams from around the globe
registered to compete. We expect this trend in increase in
participation from around the world is expected for future
HACK3D competitions. As more teams participate in these
challenge, the blue team organizers can compile innovative
attacks and benchmarks to evaluate the security methods and
uncover new attack vectors through crowd-sourcing.
H. Lessons Learned
Table I maps the challenges to the threat taxonomy and
summarizes the skill sets used by participants. By analyzing
the performance of the blue and read teams, the following
lessons were learned
1) More information can be extracted from leaked files
than what is anticipated. For example, in HACK3D
Challenge 3, one team looked into the metadata of the
corrupted G-code and extracted valuable information. In
Challenge 5, one team determined information about the
software and designer that created the original CAD file.
2) Prior 3D printing and CAD experiences can be advan-
tageous in reverse engineering attacks. In HACK3D
Challenge 2, past experiences in 3D printing helped in the
attacks. Theoretically, there are around 50 million possi-
ble angle combinations, but an attacker with rich printing
experiences can quickly rule out many combinations. In
Challenge 4, the red team’s individual design experiences
led to different male connector CAD models.
3) Attackers need not necessarily be experts in DM
to launch a successful attack. In HACK3D Challenge
1, commercial CAD and add-in tools gave participants
without any experiences an advantage. These software
can aid attackers in reverse engineering situations.
4) Multi-disciplinary knowledge and skills are useful
both from an attacker and a defenders perspective.
Although one does not require a deep understanding of
cybersecurity to launch an attack on DM systems and
supply chains, more sophisticated and novel attacks can
be developed if one can combine knowledge and expertise
from different disciplines like computer science, elec-
trical engineering, mechanical engineering, and material
science. This is also why HACK3D challenges strongly
encourage participants who had different technical back-
grounds to join forces with each other and form cross-
disciplinary teams. The skills employed by the teams in
the attacks are listed in Table I.
5) Attacks are not created equal. Each HACK3D chal-
lenge asked the participants to achieve the same attack
goal, so all the successful attacks in each challenge
completed the same purpose. However, since the partici-
pants tackled the same problem from various angles, the
developed attacks require different countermeasures. For
example, reverse engineering can be thwarted by design
obfuscation, and secret file leakage requires stronger
access control and authentication in the information tech-
nology (IT) system.
6) Attacks can originate in any stage in the DM supply
chain. The HACK3D challenges show that attackers can
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF ATTACK METHODS PROPOSED BY HACK3D TEAMS.
Threat Taxonomy (Goal/Method/Target) Countermeasure Information Exploited Red team Skills
Challenge 1 Counterfeit/Reverse Engineer/CAD (point cloud) Obfuscation Geometric Information Reverse Engineering


















Challenge 5 Counterfeit/Reverse Engineer/CAD (IGES) Obfuscation
Geometric Information
Hidden Code CAD







launch attacks at any stage in the DM supply chain,
including STL files, IGES files, G-code files, and the
physical prints. DM security researchers should design
and deploy security measures to protect the DM supply
chain end-to-end.
7) The taxonomy outlines the numerous defenses and at-
tack pathways. In the 3 years of HACK3D, we explored
a small set of pathways through the taxonomy. We exhort
the emerging manufacturing cybersecurity community to
study the unexplored threat taxonomy pathways. NYU
Center for Cybersecurity will continue to do so in future
HACK3D challenges.
8) There is a huge space for the attackers to explore and
exploit. The HACK3D challenges follow the philosophy
in [13], and were designed to unleash the imagination
of attackers. Only the attack targets were defined by
each HACK3D challenge, and the participants are free to
find their own way to accomplish the goal. Participants
often surprised the challenge designers with their creative
attacks. For example, the information leakage from the
metadata in a G-code file was unexpected.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Securing the DM cyber-physical system is a challenging
task. We are conducting an annual crowdsourcing red-team-
blue-team event to assess the strength of the DM security
methods yielding novel attacks on them. While it is in its
formative years, HACK3D showed that red teams with a range
of skills –with minimal knowledge in DM and cyber security
to expert interdisciplinary knowledge– can develop innovative
attacks in defeating the embedded security. The defenses and
the attacks can be used to benchmark both future defenses and
attacks for the DM community. The approaches documented
by HACK3D offer insights into the next generation of DM
security methods and their application in the DM manufac-
turing processes. Consistently, we noticed that the red team
participants obtained more information from the artifacts than
we anticipated and this informed effective attacks. Despite a
stringent timeline for solving the HACK3D challenges, the
red teams made significant advancements and many of them
solved the challenges. Clearly, a multi-disciplinary training is
important for the emerging DM workforce to develop DM-
unique security methods for DM CPS. Otherwise they may not
anticipate many of the impending attack vectors. HACK3D
will continue in Fall 2021 and we project over 60 teams
(and 180 students) to participate. Future HACK3D challenges
will investigate unexplored pathways through the DM threat
taxonomy. All benchmarks 2 from these HACK3D challenges
can be used by the DM community to improve defenses
and train the next generation of DM workforce. From our
experience with organizing CSAW Capture the Flag and the
embedded security challenges [14], we are optimistic that
HACK3D attacks and defenses will become the basis for an
open, community-accessible benchmark resource that the DM
community can use, add onto, and improve DM cybersecurity.
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